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ABSTRACT 
EXPLAINING PARTITION: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY 
DILEMMA IN THE CYPRUS CRISIS OF 1974 
By 
Michael Todd Smith 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2009 
In this thesis the proposed link between a security dilemma at the 
domestic-level of analysis and partition following ethnic conflict is examined in 
the context of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The original framework of the argument 
being examined was offered by Chaim Kaufmann and is analyzed here by 
comparing and contrasting the history of Cyprus with the components of the 
framework. The thesis suggests that the framework does not adequately explain 
the partition in the case of Cyprus, as the history of that conflict does not reflect 
the components observable in the proposed linkage between the security 
dilemma and partition, nor does the situation fully reflect the traditional notion of a 
security dilemma. 
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CHAPTER I 
EXPLAINING PARTITION: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Since the development of the modern concept of sovereignty in the 17th 
century, there have been countless examples of territories, enclosed by political 
borders, that have seen their shape and size changed and reduced as a result of 
human factors. Such changes often came at the end of wars, in which the losing 
side was compelled to surrender "spoils" of sufficient value, so as to have made 
the winner's efforts justifiable. At times, these changes came when a newly 
ascendant authority determined that the lines on the map would be more 
appropriately drawn in different ways. Other times still, groups of people in a 
given territory simply agreed that living apart was more amenable than living 
together. 
There are numerous other ways in which geopolitical shifts have come 
about, of course. What is significant for political scientists today is the ongoing 
effort to name and classify events and phenomena that result in visible changes 
of the lines drawn on the maps of the world. Among these phenomena is what 
political scientists call partition. While political scientists do not yet agree if 
partition "was done" or "had occurred", it is mostly agreed that partition "was" on 
the island of Cyprus in 1974, and in numerous other locations around the world. 
The question usually submitted is "why?" 
1 
By the end of 1974, the island of Cyprus had been split in two: a wide, 
mostly uninhabitable strip of impassable territory came to divide the northern 
third of the island from the southern two-thirds. What would lie in between was 
initially deemed entirely uninhabitable. This condition did not come as a result of 
a powerful and destructive geophysical phenomenon, but rather the result of 
political actions. This event, a type of political schism, had been seen in 
numerous historical conflicts: the creation of the Irish state, the division of India 
and Pakistan, and the separation of the two Koreas, to name a few. Cyprus was 
just the latest, and there have been more since. However, it has become one of 
the most discussed and studied examples, in no small part because of the 
political environment both on and around the island at the time of the partition. 
Why does partition occur? Why was the island of Cyprus partitioned, and what 
lessons does that outcome hold for those studying partition generally? 
Numerous theorists have proposed answers to these questions. This project 
seeks to explore the proposed explanation that the intrastate security dilemma 
can account for partition in cases where ethnic conflict has preceded the partition 
itself. 
Here partition is to be considered a continuing problem in political science, 
and the security dilemma, a well-known theory concerning conflict escalation, is 
treated as a possible cause for partition under certain circumstances. While this 
project is focused on developing a better understanding through existing theory 
of whether partition can occur as a result of the security dilemma, and is 
motivated by a desire to evaluate such theory in the context of a crucial case 
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study of the partition of Cyprus, we must discuss more fundamental and arguably 
unresolved questions about the nature of both partition and the security dilemma 
at the same time. 
With regard to partition, there is little agreement among the authors that 
write about partition generally with regard to the basic definition of partition, how 
it arises or how it is imposed. Indeed, there is little discussion in the literature 
available today that directly approaches defining partition and the reasons for its 
occurrence: analysis often morphs quickly into arguments on the worth of 
partition as ethnic conflict management policy for the various powers in a position 
to impose it on others, or for those very few states or communities that are said 
to have chosen to impose it on themselves, such as Sweden and Norway in the 
early 20th century.1 
With regard to the security dilemma as a potential cause of partition, there 
is much discussion about the security dilemma's use in explaining political events 
at various levels of analysis, and much disagreement on the matter. What was 
proposed to explain events in the anarchic international community has more 
recently been applied to ethnic conflicts; the appropriateness of this application is 
far from settled in the fields of political science and international relations. 
Additionally, the issue of identity is one that informs the security dilemma at the 
domestic-level of analysis; something entirely absent from the original "dilemma." 
Strong arguments have been made as to the proper level of analysis from 
which to consider partition as a problem, whether at the international level of 
1
 Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the 
Theoretical Literature," World Politics 52 (2000) 
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analysis or the domestic level of analysis. However, in order to test the viability 
of the security dilemma as a cause of partition during or following ethnic conflict, 
partition must be treated, at least nominally, as a domestic-level problem. This 
will be tested directly through a previously-enunciated notion that links the 
security dilemma with partition. Though proffered by various scholars, this 
concept is reviewed here through the work of Chaim Kaufmann. The theory finds 
that the causes of past partitions which are rooted in an ethnic conflict are the 
result of acute intrastate security dilemmas. While the work of Kaufmann is 
primarily prescriptive, directed at supporting the use of partition in the present 
and the future to resolve ethnic conflicts, Kaufmann's own conception of partition 
is based on perceptions of those partitions that have occurred in the past, and 
this includes the partition of Cyprus. Essentially, this makes Kaufmann's theories 
concerning the origins of partition testable. This particular understanding of 
partition is based on a domestic determinants level of analysis, at which an 
intrastate security dilemma naturally be pegged , but through its testing one can 
observe whether or not such determinants are sufficient or even appropriate to 
explain partition in the case in question. 
In this paper we take the position that these perceptions of the security 
dilemma and its explanatory value with regard to partition are not entirely 
accurate when applied to the critical case study used here, the case of the 
partition of Cyprus in the summer and autumn of 1974. For the purposes of this 
study, then, the dependent variable in the testing that will be done is partition 
itself, though qualified by intending for the explanation to only cover those 
4 
partitions during or following ethnic conflict; the proposed reasons for partition, 
the security dilemma, is what is to be tested directly. Cyprus will stand in as the 
case in which this testing will be conducted in a thorough and critical way. 
The scope of this paper's study, therefore, is to remain limited, focusing 
primarily on a crucial case study that is meant to both test a preexisting theory of 
partition, and to explore the dynamics of the security dilemma and partition 
generally. In the rest of this chapter, the development of both partition and the 
security dilemma as concepts in political science will be briefly traced, which will 
be followed by the status of the concepts in the literature today. The purpose of 
this is to provide perspective; the epistemological problems of these two 
concepts need to be understood, so that the conclusions of this study can be 
held in appropriate perspective. Also of significance is a discussion of the shift in 
use of the security dilemma as an international-level phenomenon to one also 
located at the domestic-determinants level. The three pieces by Chaim 
Kaufmann that will provide the general structure of the argument that is to be 
tested will be described, as will the background for his take on the independent 
variables in cases of partition that follows ethnic conflict. The methodology for 
this study will be described, as will the ways in which the testing is to be 
conducted on the selected case. In Chapter 2, the dependent variable will be 
measured and described, with an emphasis on the history of domestic politics in 
Cyprus leading up to its partition. In Chapters 3 and 4, the independent variables 
described by Kaufmann in his work will be defined for this project and then 
described in the case of Cyprus. While Kaufmann refers directly to the intrastate 
5 
security dilemma, he identifies components of such, including components 
relating to identity, and each component must be matched to the Cyprus case in 
order for proper testing. The argument that links the independent variables 
offered by Kaufmann to partition will be evaluated. In addition to shedding more 
light on the dynamics of partition, this exercise will hopefully provide direction for 
future inquiry into the nature of partition and theories of partition rooted in the 
domestic determinants level of analysis. 
A review of the relevant literature concerning both partition and the 
security dilemma is necessary to understand the complexities involved in the 
subjects of this project. The two concepts are treated in this chapter as separate 
and distinct; the potential causal links between them are to be evaluated in later 
chapters. The development of partition as a concept is first addressed, followed 
by the development of the security dilemma. 
Partition in Political Science 
In order to approach the question of why political partition occurs, one 
must first attempt to develop a solid conception of what partition is, both 
throughout history and today. Based on the great many definitions available and 
widespread disagreement between scholars on the subject, this is not a 
straightforward task. Partition is often thought of as simply the splitting of a 
nation in two; as we shall see, its classification is not nearly so simple. 
Additionally, the literature on partition is both analytical and prescriptive at times, 
and oftentimes authors write from both perspectives. Kaufmann is among such 
authors, and his place in the literature, informed by a strong realist background, 
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comes out of the oftentimes opposing perspectives that make up the study of 
partition. Kaufmann's definition of partition is just one among many, though it is 
reflective of themes that have built throughout the past half-century of the study 
of the concept. As the study of partition has moved from defining the concept to 
asking why it arises, the discussion of this development is crucial in 
understanding the nature of partition in this study (with regard to Kaufmann) and 
generally. Kaufmann's prescriptive arguments are indeed based on foundational 
arguments that are not settled issues in the field of political science. For a fair 
evaluation of Kaufmann's take on partition, the development of the concept as an 
issue in political science and its state in the literature is expressed in succinct 
terms here. 
The general concept of partition is not new and it can be said to predate 
the notion of Westphalian sovereignty. Originally a matter of "estate law" in 
feudal times,2 Brendan O'Leary points to the division of Poland in the late 18th 
century as the basis for the modern, "pejorative associations of partition,"3 and 
for a transition to something that was, as it related to sovereign states, outside 
generally acceptable norms. Until the early 20th century, partition continued to be 
seen as a nasty procedure of statecraft "for the benefit of empire, to strengthen 
rule or simplify administration."4 Since then, it has been referred to as a method 
2
 Brendan O'Leary, "Analysing partition: definition, classification and explanation," Political 
Geography 26 (2007): 888 
3
 Ibid., 888 
4
 Robert Getso, "Partition and Its Precedents," Peace Review 11:4 (1999): 591 
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by which colonial powers have extricated themselves from their colonies and 
have left a basis for administration along ethnic lines. 
In the introduction to his book Warpaths: The Politics of Partition, Robert 
K. Schaeffer describes the increased occurrence or practice of what he labels as 
partition in the international community after the Second World War, and notes 
that partition would essentially come and go in contemporaneous groupings, with 
three observable periods in which partition occurred.5 The first period came 
immediately after World War II; the second with the division of Pakistan and 
Cyprus, and the third with Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia. These periods 
were well defined by the interludes between them, during which few partitions 
were observed. 
Perhaps as a result of this perceived increase in the occurrence of 
partition, in the last quarter of the 20th century partition began to be promoted by 
some international relations theorists as the most effective (or "best") way to 
resolve long-standing and bitter ethnic conflicts. John J. Mearsheimer was the 
co-author of two prominent articles in the 1990's which prescribed the use of 
partition in the Balkan conflicts, and preceded a number of authors that would 
make arguments that ethnic conflicts often create sufficient conditions for 
partition.6 On the other hand, many others came to reject the utility of partition as 
5
 Robert K. Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition. New York: Harper and Collins 
(1990): 8 
6
 See John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer," The New Republic 14 June 
1993; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," The New 
Republic 18 December 1995; 
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a tool of statecraft7; others still see partition as a political phenomenon akin to 
any other, like war.8 Despite these various contexts in which partition has been 
reportedly observed and referred to, the precise definition of what constitutes a 
partition is elusive. 
Partition is generally defined in the literature as akin to what O'Leary 
describes as "a previously unified territorial entity... divided into two or more 
parts, which may be marked with borders"9 - or, as stated above, splitting a 
nation in two. Beyond this very broad definition there are a variety of more 
narrow ones (and, surprisingly, a few broader ones), and this results in a 
considerable variety of historical instances which may be described (or coded) as 
a partition, and those that may not be. As a result, some suggest that "there is 
no generalizable wisdom derived from the literature on partition"10 at all. Despite 
the long history of partition as a concept, the authors included in what is referred 
to by Sambanis as the "first wave"11 of partition theory scholars began writing 
only in the second-half of the 20th century; indeed, we are only up to the second 
wave of scholars on the subject. The first wave generally concerned itself with 
7
 See Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," Foreign Affairs (1997): 22-34; 
Jonathan D. Greenberg, "Divided Limbs, Phantom Limbs: Partition in the Indian Subcontinent, 
Palestine, China and Korea," Journal of International Affairs 57:2 (2004): 7-27; Dan Lindley, 
"Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus," International Studies 
Perspectives 8 (2007): 224-241 
8
 See, for example, Brendan O'Leary, 886-908 
9
 Brendan O'Leary, 887 
10
 Dan Lindley, 224-241 See also Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, "Partition as a 
Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions," American Political Science 
Review 101:4 (2007): 678 
11
 Nicholas Sambanis, 437. Sambanis identifies a number of first wave scholars, including 
Donald Horowitz, Robert A. Dahl, and Samuel P. Huntington. 
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the proper definition of partition, while the second wave has been more vocal on 
the question of "why" partition occurs, as well as some authors' efforts of 
prescription for present-day conflicts. 
Of the scholars of the "first wave", the work of Stanley Waterman, a 
political geographer, and Donald L. Horowitz, whose often-cited, lengthy volume 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict12 addresses widespread issues of ethnic conflict and 
how to manage the related violence, seem especially relevant because of the 
contrast between them. In four pages, Horowitz takes on partition as a possible 
strategy for ethnic conflict management, and very simply defines partition as 
"separating the antagonists,"13 in an ethnic conflict, especially where they are 
territorially concentrated. On the other hand, Waterman defines partition as "a 
process resulting from a situation in which two or more groups differentiated on 
the basis of ethnicity, nationality or ideology find conditions more comfortable to 
govern separate, more uniform areas than to live in partnership with one 
another."14 
One definition explains partition as a method; the other explains partition 
as a phenomenon. One definition explains partition as being imposed by a third 
party; the other explains partition as a condition reached by the parties in conflict 
These are two continually reinforced dichotomies that exist in the writings of 
12
 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press 
(1985) 
13
 Ibid., 588-589 
14
 Stanley Waterman, "Partition - A Problem in Political Geography," in Peter Taylor and John 
House, Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Directions, Kent: Crook Helm Ltd. 
(1984): 99 
10 
ethnic conflict theorists and political geographers considering partition during the 
first wave. 
More recent, second wave scholars have not been any more consistent 
with each other in their definitions, however. O'Leary, a prolific writer on the 
subject of ethnic conflict more concerned with defining partition as a 
phenomenon than worrying about its efficacy, emphasizes the need to 
distinguish partition from secession. He therefore suggests the more specific 
definition of "a fresh border cut through at least one community's national 
homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns 
or authorities."15 This definition clearly describes partition as a phenomenon. He 
goes on to make clear distinctions between partition and the act of secession. 
Not everyone distinguishes partition and secession, however. When 
defining partition, Jaroslav Tir specifically includes the motivation for partition in 
his definition, with secessionist-based divisions as a type of partition. He defines 
partition as "an internally motivated (i.e. secessionist) division of a country's 
homeland... territory that results in the creation of at least one new independent 
secessionist state."16 
Most relevant to this paper, Chaim Kaufmann in turn defines partition in 
the context of those imposing it.17 He states that partition is a "(separation) jointly 
decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides 
15
 Brendan O'Leary, 888 
16
 Jaroslav Tir, "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of 
Partitions," Journal of Peace Research, 42:5 (2005): 545 
17
 Though, as will be demonstrated, Kaufmann's definition does not imply that the causes of 
partition rest with the powers imposing it. 
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(and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on 
both sides by a stronger third party."18 Kaufmann, like O'Leary, goes on to 
distinguish this from secession, though his definition for that phenomenon differs 
from both O'Leary and Tir. 
Chapman and Roeder observe that while there is little agreement over a 
precise definition of partition, there has been some general consistency between 
those they label as "comparativists" and those they label as "international-
relations scholars."19 The comparativists have tended to clearly distinguish 
partition from other forms of post-conflict institutional arrangements (such as de 
facto separations or autonomy), whereas the international-relations scholars tend 
to lump these concepts together (which Chapman and Roeder allege "conflates 
important distinctions among different domestic political institutions that shape 
post-settlement political processes inside states"20). In the above examples, the 
political geographers (Waterman and O'Leary) would constitute the 
comparativists, while Horowitz and Kaufmann are clearly among the 
international-relations scholars. Chapman and Roeder don't clearly observe 
consistent distinctions between partition and secession in their categorization, 
however; one can observe that while the unlike pairing of Kaufmann and O'Leary 
distinguish secession from partition in their respective theories, other unlike 
pairings do not. 
18
 Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the 
Twentieth Century," International Security 23:2, (1998): 125 
19
 Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678 
20 
Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678 
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Why is the discussion of these details important? While Kaufmann and 
Mearsheimer are firmly rooted in a traditional realist perspective concerning the 
discussion surrounding partition, typology affects dramatically the study of such a 
concept which has affected millions of people over the course of the past few 
centuries. On this point, there is valuable insight provided by the Russian 
scholar Valery Tishkov's demonstrated struggle to properly define and classify 
"ethnic conflict."21 While his argument is arguably constructivist in nature, it is 
instructive because of the fragmented nature of partition and how the way in 
which it is studied may impact the outcomes that are reached by scholars 
determining its status in the field. One might wonder, and justifiably so, how 
constructivist arguments can be relevant to realist interpreters of the concept of 
partition, a group Kaufmann and his predecessors easily belong to. Realist 
arguments like those of Kaufmann must still depend on the consistency of the 
definitions of concepts being worked with, in order to evaluate the power 
relationships between two or more actors. Prescribing something that is not yet 
consistently defined can conceivably lead to major issues in the study of the 
subject. Aspects of this problem may be observable when studying partition. 
Efforts to Explain Partition with Theory and History 
The scholarly work of Mearsheimer and Kaufmann, and of those reacting 
to them, has nevertheless begun to formulate some general answers to the "why" 
of partition. These authors try to correlate the presence of certain types of ethnic 
conflict in countries which have undergone (successful) partitions in the past. 
21
 Valery Tishkov, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies 
and Data, Journal of Peace Research 36:5 (1999): 571-591 
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They then go on to argue this as a basis for the use of partition in the future. 
Many (including this author) take issue with the specific components of their 
theories, yet the scholarship on partition has proceeded from first wave, when the 
focus was largely on definition, to the second wave, where definition is 
accompanied by the "why" and the "how effective?" This being said, there is little 
in the literature of both the first and second wave to suggest that much has been 
"settled" on the topic of partition. 
For now this author hesitates to provide a further litany of partition 
definitions; the disagreements as to what might constitute a precise definition will 
continue. However, it is very useful to look at the practical side of partition 
theory. What disputes or conflicts can be considered to have resulted in, or to 
have been ended by, partition? As with answering the question "what is 
partition?" it of course depends on who you ask, and the edges of the inclusive 
group of "events that were partitions" vary accordingly. Those who define 
partition narrowly might include states that O'Leary describes as having 
undergone partition based on his "fresh cut" definition: Ireland and Hungary in 
1920, India in 1947, Palestine in 1937 and 1948, and Cyprus in 1974.22 These 
are commonly discussed cases in the literature; Ireland, India and Palestine are 
almost uniformly considered the definitive examples of partition by those 
engaging in a discussion of the various cases. 
Those who define partition broadly, as Nicholas Sambanis decides to do 
in his heavily quantitative study of partition from 2000, might include many, many 
22
 Brendan O'Leary, 889-890 
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others. When Sambanis states that partition is simply "a war outcome that 
involves both border adjustment and demographic changes," he includes 
examples like Azerbaijan in 1996, China-Taiwan in 1947, Georgia twice in the 
1990's, the former Yugoslavia multiple times, and even Cyprus in 1963 (when 
there was a limited degree of ethnic "unmixing" as a result of Turkish-Cypriot 
formation of enclaves in major cities and towns).23 Indeed, this definition would 
permit many of the states involved in many of the conflicts of the past century to 
be labeled as having undergone partition. 
The Purpose of the Study 
We do not aspire to resolve all of the typological difficulties that partition 
presents and indeed, exposure to where partition is said to have occurred in the 
past is relevant here merely to show the extent to which it is a problem in 
international politics. This discussion is also intended to provide perspective 
however, and to draw out some analytical utility from what has been written on 
partition before. The range of political phenomena that is encompassed by the 
term "partition" may be greater than or less than what is covered by those 
definitions that are discussed in some quick detail here. We can see that many 
nations over the past century alone have been split in two or more pieces; 
generalizing about those splits and why they happen is the difficult part. 
For this paper, however, it is useful to take one part of the ongoing 
argument, and start looking for answers. Over the past two decades, a growing 
number of neorealist theorists have begun to apply a political theory known as 
the security dilemma to conflicts seen to be "intrastate" as opposed to 
23
 Nicholas Sambanis, 447-449 
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"interstate." Among those authors is Chaim Kaufmann, who attributes partitions 
in various places over the past century as having been necessitated by domestic-
level security dilemmas. Included among the cases from which Kaufmann draws 
his conclusions is the partition of Cyprus in 1974. Whether his understanding of 
partition and the security dilemma, and indeed a genera! understanding of these 
political concepts, can be correlated with the situation in Cyprus is the primary 
question to be answered here. We take Chaim Kaufmann's writings, and, based 
off of his suggested typology of partition and the dynamics of the security 
dilemma as he understands them, apply it to the case of Cyprus to see if such 
ideas holds up for the specific case of Cyprus. As previously stated, partition in 
political science, including the basic definition and classification of it, is not a 
settled topic in the literature. While Kaufmann's prescriptive arguments will not 
be explored here, there is a great deal which must be observed about partition 
and how effectively, or not, the domestic-level application of the security dilemma 
can explain the dynamics of it. In order to proceed to testing Kaufmann's ideas, 
we must first understand the background of the security dilemma, and how it 
came to be used to address domestic-level conflict. 
The Security Dilemma in Political Science 
Kaufmann's theories were chosen in lieu of many others that exist 
because he contends that the basis for partition having been imposed on ethnic 
communities in conflicts in the past lies in certain characteristics of those ethnic 
conflicts, most notably the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a well-
known and well-studied concept that comes out of traditionally realist ways of 
16 
looking at international relationships. Before describing the rest of Kaufmann's 
work, some background on realism and the security dilemma is appropriate. 
Realism is a term often used in international relations and political 
science, and it generally refers to a school of thought concerning the way in 
which states behave in relation to one another. The basic tenets of realism are 
that states are primarily self-interested actors and will act to pursue their interests 
in an anarchic international arena. This is best done by maximizing the power of 
the state in relation to all of the other states, and preserving any advantages that 
the state may have. Political scientists often look back to Kenneth Waltz as the 
one who first clearly articulated the role of realism in international relations, and 
since the publication of his Man, the State and War, many others have refined 
the logic of realism with regard to problems that appear in the international 
community. 
The security dilemma can be seen as one of the early efforts to refine the 
typically realist view of international relations. It has been traditionally viewed as 
an international relations theory that can be used to understand the "ramping up" 
of conflict between two states, most notably with regards to arms races. States 
that exist in an anarchic situation will naturally tend to try to increase their own 
security. While the concept dates back to the 1950's in separate works by John 
Herz and Herbert Butterfield24 , Robert Jervis' work in a 1976 book and the article 
"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" in 1978 is often pointed to as the 
foundation of security dilemma theory. According to Jervis, the security dilemma 
24
 Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy?" Journal of 
Peace Research 36:2 (1999): 183 
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is based on the notion that "an increase in one state's security decreases the 
security of others"25 and that, as a result, the others will attempt to compensate, 
leading to the original state's perceived reduction in security and so on. While 
Jervis himself goes on to apply his theory's logic on an individual level (police 
officer and suspect in a dark alley26), the security dilemma was usually 
considered to be most relevant with interstate conflicts. 
However, a number of theorists since the Cold War have taken the 
security dilemma logic and attempted to apply it to ethnic conflict. In his article 
"The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy'?" Paul Roe 
provides a sweeping summary of the transition of the concept of security 
dilemma from one focused on relations in the international community to those at 
a domestic level between ethnicities in conflict. Roe points out the scholars who 
have led this transition and the ways in which structures at the international level 
can be approximated by domestic-level structures. 
The scholars Roe discusses include Posen, Mearscheimer and (Stuart) 
Kaufman, among others. Posen, for one, asserts that the security dilemma has 
"considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military 
conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires."27 As 
summarized by Melander, Posen "applied the logic of the security dilemma to 
ethnic conflict, and argued that geographically induced first-strike advantages 
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30:2 (1978): 186 
Ibid., 189 
Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, 35:1 (1993): 43 
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help explain the outbreak of ethnic warfare... (and that) first-strike advantages 
are greater if ethnic groups in conflict live interspersed with each other."28 Yet, in 
order for this to be the case, numerous domestic-level structures must be shown 
to be similar to those at the international level. Roe states that the logic of the 
security dilemma is said to remain constant in intrastate conflicts when 
"conditions (within states) are similar to those between states in the international 
system,"29 and Stuart Kaufman, as quoted in Roe, points out that while "strictly 
speaking the security dilemma should not apply to contending ethnic groups 
within a state... anarchy can be approximated... if ethnic groups effectively 
challenge the government's legitimacy and control over its territory."30 Anarchy, 
then, and the security threat of possible first-strike capability that comes with the 
arrangement of groups under anarchy, need to be structures that can be 
approximated within the domestic-level situation characterized by ethnic conflict. 
There are other structures, however. Kaufman is also quoted in Roe as saying 
that "the neorealist concept of a security dilemma cannot be mechanically 
applied to ethnic conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not 
enough to create a security dilemma between communities which may have 
been at peace for decades. An ethnic security dilemma requires reciprocal fears 
of group extinction."31 
28
 Erik Melander, "The Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma 
and Ethnic War," European Journal of International Relations 15:1 (2009): 96 
29
 Paul Roe, 188 
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 Stuart Kaufman as quoted in Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as 
a Tragedy?" Journal of Peace Research 36:2 (1999): 189 
31
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19 
According to Roe, Stuart Kaufman and others, an additional, necessary 
component of the intrastate security dilemma is the threat to the continuing 
existence of identity, especially ethnic identity. For Roe, this presents what is 
better termed as an "(inter-) societal security dilemma,"32 which essentially 
means that the intrastate security dilemma is one between ethnicities which hold 
on to distinct cultural identities, with the fear that these identities are at risk from 
the strengthening of the other cultural identities. In this way, the notion of 
straightforward "increases in security by means of an increase in armaments by a 
state in the anarchical system of world politics leading to a security dilemma" is 
replaced by a variety of ways to increase or decrease the security of identity-
based groups in a system merely resembling anarchy. Roe points out that in this 
system, "one society (minority group) seeking only to defend its identity within the 
state may be perceived by another (majority group/state) as harbouring 
secessionist goals."33 
The finer points of the argument that identity is a crucial part of any 
intrastate security dilemma have yet to be agreed upon. However, it is an 
intriguing notion, especially when considering specific cases, such as that of 
Cyprus. Roe's above quotation would, from a bird's-eye view, seem to describe 
the character of some ethnic conflicts. Roe is not alone in his assertion that 
identity plays a role in the intrastate security dilemma, either. This notion is, in 
fact, one of the major tenets of Chaim Kaufmann's writings on how ethnic 
conflicts come to an end. As we will see, Kaufmann asserts the same notion and 
32
 Paul Roe, 194 
33
 Ibid., 199 
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applies traditional security dilemma logic to identity-based ethnic conflict and the 
events leading up to past partitions, including in the case of Cyprus. Kaufmann 
links the intrastate security dilemma definitively with partition, and this is why his 
theories are crucial in the case study that will be described here. 
Linking the Security Dilemma to Partition 
Chaim Kaufmann is a prolific scholar on issues of ethnic conflict and their 
resolution, writing from a distinctly realist perspective and often advocating 
methods of intervention as internationalist policy for domestic disputes. In three 
highly relevant articles one can see the basis for Kaufmann's conviction that 
partition ought to be employed to resolve ethnic conflict; this conviction is based 
on Kaufmann's understanding of why past partitions, and the various other 
possible conclusions of ethnic conflicts, have occurred. It is this understanding 
that we look at here, and then proceed to test in the case-study portion of this 
paper. Kaufmann was chosen among a number of scholars which express the 
general notion that intrastate security dilemmas lead to partitions in cases of 
ethnic conflict; this is because of the clarity with which Kaufmann has expressed 
this notion. According to Kaufmann, two ethnicities in conflict in a state must be 
separated in order for the conflict to end; therefore, in lieu of the destruction of 
one of the communities, partition must occur. The three most relevant articles 
are summarized below, and make his reasoning clear. 
Kaufmann's 1996 article, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic 
Civil Wars," laid the groundwork for later articles which more directly addressed 
partition, but the basic assumptions that Kaufmann lays out in the article are 
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crucial for understanding his perspectives on partition. This early article of 
Kaufmann's lays out the ways in which he believes ethnic wars come to an end. 
According to Kaufmann, ethnic wars can be distinguished from other, 
ideological conflicts due to a single factor: the "flexibility of individual loyalties."34 
Inflexible identities are characteristic of ethnic conflict. Loyalties in ethnic 
conflicts are easier to evaluate, says Kaufmann, as they are consistently tied to 
one's ethnic identity. Kaufmann assumes that ethnic identities are "fixed by 
birth,"35 though he acknowledges that others would not agree with his 
characterization of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are the "hardest," and therefore 
most inflexible, because of their dependence on many things tied to identity 
generally, such as "language, culture, and religion... and parentage."36 A central 
assumption of his is that a conflict between two or more ethnically-based 
communities generally has the effect of hardening the ethnic identities of those 
involved along ethnic lines, and creates a security dilemma that is heightened 
severely when those communities' populations are heavily intermixed. Because 
of the logic of the security dilemma, Kaufmann argues that any conflict between 
ethnicities37 will not end until the security dilemma ends; Kaufmann believes this 
can only occur by "physical separation of the rival groups."38 Kaufmann 
34
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acknowledges in his early article that partition can occur without ethnic 
separation, but that this merely increases conflict and is not logically based. 
The second article of Kaufmann is especially relevant as it more directly 
approaches the issue of partition. In his piece, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic 
Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," Kaufmann goes 
further in detailing the circumstances in which partition may arise. He claims that 
due to the security dilemma in ethnic wars, warring communities will always be 
separated before the conflict ends.39 Because of this, partition becomes one of 
just a few possible outcomes, all of which incorporate separation. It is here that 
Kaufmann defines partition in his own terms,40 from the perspective of those that 
impose it. This definition, however, is based on Kaufmann's notion that the 
situation "on-the-ground" in an ethnic civil war compels the "responsible powers" 
to impose partition. This crucial point is one which will be thoroughly examined in 
the case study. Based on his definition, Kaufmann lists 10 partitions that have 
occurred during the twentieth-century, all of which he says have led to the 
formation of new states.41 Among them are the relatively peaceful examples 
Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the 
Twentieth Century," 124 
40
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occurring in Norway (1905), Singapore (1965) and Slovakia (1993), as well as 
the more violent examples of Ireland (1921), India (1947) and Cyprus (1974). 
A simple, early criticism of Kaufmann's particular definition of partition is 
that it does not seem to lead to a more thorough typology than a distinction 
between those partitions that are violent and those that are not violent, and 
partition's distinction from secession. Kaufmann distinguishes partition from 
secession by defining the latter as a "new (state) created by the unilateral action 
of a rebellious ethnic group."42 Essentially, if both parties in a conflict agree to 
the separation, it is partition (hence the peaceful partitions); if a separation is 
imposed on two parties by an outside party, it is partition (hence the violent 
partitions). However if one party successfully separates from the original, it is not 
partition at all, but rather secession. This can become confusing. 
His article's primary focus, though, is on the favorability of partition in 
various situations; it is not a work like that of O'Leary, who is concentrated on 
defining and classifying it. After briefly evaluating four partitions (Ireland, India, 
Palestine and Cyprus) on the basis of their appropriateness given the 
circumstances, Kaufmann concludes by offering policy recommendations to 
those considering ethnic conflict management techniques. 
The third of Kaufmann's works that is relevant here is his own evaluation 
of the partition of Cyprus. While it will be more useful in the portion of this paper 
that discusses the case study of Cyprus, there is one observation that will be 
made about it here: while the article never restates his earlier definition of 
42
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partition, its discussion of partition does not remain entirely consistent with that 
earlier definition. Kaufmann states prior to discussing the 1974 partition that the 
conflict in Cyprus in 1963-1964 resulted in its first partition when many Turkish-
Cypriots formed enclaves scattered throughout the island. These enclaves were 
not linked with each other, nor were they concentrated in one particular section of 
the island. Indeed, there remained many mixed towns and most of the cities 
continued to have neighborhoods made up of both communities. The Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots (which will be defined as our ethnic communities in the case 
study) certainly did not agree to this "partition," and Kaufmann even argues that 
the Greek-Cypriots were very much against the formation of the enclaves - a 
basis for the security dilemma which would, theoretically, develop. However, this 
"partition" was not imposed by foreign powers or a third party either - in fact, if 
there was a time at which foreign powers had the least to do with the island, it 
was during this first post-independence island-wide conflict. In the context of 
those that impose partition, the events of 1963-1964 would seem not to reflect 
partition; if anything they might be seen as a form of secession under 
Kaufmann's definition. The word partition is used too freely in this instance. 
From the content of these articles we can clearly identify why, from 
Kaufmann's perspective, partitions in the past occurred. The purpose of this 
paper is to test this perspective, and as a result of the testing, challenge it. 
Kaufmann's explanation for why states in ethnic civil war are partitioned explains 
that "once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the 
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populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions."43 In 
his theory, "disputes between communities which see themselves as having 
distinct heritages over the power relationship between the communities"44 results 
in a security dilemma, which cannot be remedied by anything other than 
separation due to the hardening of ethnic identities. According to Kaufmann, 
"ethnic war causes ethnic unmixing"45 and while the formal partition may require 
the intervention of an outside entity to enact the partition, the primary causes for 
that partition lay in the security dilemma posed by the ethnic mobilization. 
Therefore, the more formal hypothesis would be: If there is an intrastate security 
dilemma (characterized by hardened ethnic identities and mobilization), then this 
leads to partition. This is the hypothesis that is to be tested here using the critical 
case study of Cyprus. The independent variable offered is that which simply 
summarizes the variables which Kaufmann expressed in the three articles as 
leading to partition, described most clearly in his second article. While the 
"primary" independent variable is the security dilemma, discussion of this from 
the perspective of Kaufmann must include the terms "hardened ethnic identities" 
and "mobilization", which he utilizes to describe his theories. This being said, 
these terms are not defined in any great detail in the three articles mentioned, 
though this conveniently allows this author flexibility in evaluating the framework 
offered by Kaufmann, and the case in question. 
43
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Testing the Link: Methodology 
In order to test Kaufmann, the use of a crucial case study will allow the 
reader to understand the details of a particular partition following an ethnic 
conflict and the dynamics which cannot be understood from the abstract. To that 
end, we have selected the partition of Cyprus as the case study for this paper. 
The selection of Cyprus is not random. The author has identified potential 
inconsistencies with Kaufmann's theories and has chosen the Cyprus case upon 
reading those theories; the references made with regards to Cyprus throughout 
Kaufmann and others' works have brought up many potential ways in which to 
examine both the problem of partition and how the security dilemma is used to 
address it, and the partition of that little Mediterranean island which for many 
decades has been the headache of countless ambassadors and negotiators. 
Due to the selection of a single case study, however, the results of this paper are 
to be viewed as limited in terms of their overall generalizability. This is a paper 
that looks at partition and the appropriateness of the security dilemma as a cause 
of partition, but is fundamentally about demonstrating that a certain explanation 
for partition may not be appropriate in the case of Cyprus. This author believes 
strongly that each individual case of partition in the past must be analyzed from a 
historical perspective to see if the same lessons learned here can be applied to 
those cases. This being said, here we test Kaufmann's theory on the Cyprus 
situation, point out discrepancies that are observed, and determine whether the 
tested theory holds up in light of available historical information. 
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With regards to the partition of Cyprus, the hypothesis that we are testing 
can be recast to suggest that partition resulted from a state of mobilization and 
hardened ethnic identity among both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots 
to the point where no political conciliation was likely to occur, and an escalation 
of the conflict between them was based on the standard logic of the security 
dilemma. Both the characteristics of the identity problem and the escalation 
caused by security dilemma logic must be present in order for the hypothesis to 
hold some value in this case. As Kaufmann's theory goes, while what literally 
imposed the partition was the invasion of the Turkish military, the underlying 
cause of the partition was the degree of polarization within the country between 
two communities (hardened ethnic identities) and the impossibility of a change in 
the situation without separation, or the complete destruction of one of the 
communities (characteristic of the security dilemma). It is the details of this 
situation that will be used to test the hypothesis. 
We must make one additional note before continuing. The conflict that 
has occurred on Cyprus in active and passive forms for the better part of 55 
years is of a character which has resulted in sensitivities surrounding the way it is 
described. While it is important to try to remain as neutral as possible in 
description, and therefore to acknowledge these sensitivities, this author also will 
attempt to make his writing as understandable as possible in relation to the 
general theory being considered. Therefore, the terms "ethnic conflict" and 
"intercommunal conflict" will be used interchangeably to reflect the use of the first 
term by Kaufmann, and the use of the second as the tacitly agreed-upon term 
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used by Cyprus scholars. This brings up a question about the distinction 
between "ethnicity" and "community". For our purposes, we make a sincere 
effort to refer to "Greek Cypriots" and "Turkish Cypriots" as those native to the 
island of Cyprus that consider themselves to be culturally Greek or culturally 
Turkish, respectively. The two groups are the communities in conflict; the 
question of the ethnicity of the participants will not be answered here. Here we 
also attempt to clearly distinguish between entities from the nations of Greece 
and Turkey and their culturally linked counterparts on the island of Cyprus by 
including the "Cypriot" identifier after a particular community. Disagreement over 
the proper terms to describe the communities continues today, nearly 35 years 
following the partition; this author makes no claims to resolving them. 
Study Organization 
The hypothesis being tested is rooted in domestic determinants as the 
level of analysis from which the cause of the partition of Cyprus can be observed, 
as the proposed cause is an intrastate security dilemma. To that end, the 
measurement of the independent variables must be in some way focused 
primarily on the domestic situation in Cyprus being the core cause of the second 
Turkish invasion and the resulting partition. The measurement of the dependent 
and independent variables are given in abstract and, for the dependent variable, 
case-specific terms below. In many ways, the choice of Kaufmann's framework 
presents considerable analytical utility, as this framework is quite loose and not 
strictly defined in its original expression in his articles. This clearly presents other 
potential problems, but for the purposes of this explorative study, it allows this 
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writer to cover considerable ground without being restricted to the confines of 
narrow definitions. 
In abstract terms, the dependent variable would be "partition" as defined 
by Chaim Kaufmann. This definition, as mentioned earlier and repeated here for 
emphasis, is: "a (separation) jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: 
either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military 
victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party." This 
definition is in some ways convenient as the imposition of partition by a third 
party is encompassed by the definition, and does not leave the imposition of 
partition to an intervening variable. Additionally, the lessons of the first chapter 
and the difficulty in defining partition at all are kept in mind as well. Kaufmann's 
definition is but one of many available. While most of the reviewed theorists 
working with partition agree that Cyprus in 1974 was an identifiable case of 
partition, not all hold the same viewpoint. However, we keep with Kaufmann's 
definition for the purposes of this paper and, using that definition, define partition 
in the Cyprus case. 
The independent variable in abstract terms would be the "presence of an 
intrastate security dilemma, characterized by the presence of mobilized ethnic 
groups with hardened ethnic identities." First, ethnic groups will be measured by 
commonality of culture and religion. Mobilization implies the willingness and 
preparedness to use organized military or otherwise violent force against another 
community. Hardened ethnic identities are defined as they are by Chaim 
Kaufmann. Ethnic identities are "fixed by birth" and "are hardest, since they 
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depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as 
parentage, which no one can change."46 The degree of polarization between the 
two communities indicates how hardened ethnic identities are. Finally, the 
intrastate security dilemma is evaluated in terms of the entire dynamic between 
the two ethnic communities in conflict. It should be mentioned that the usage of 
"intrastate" before security dilemma is intended to distinguish the security 
dilemma Kaufmann describes from the sort that might exist between powers on 
the systemic level. It has become common practice to use "intrastate" in 
domestic cases; however, Kaufmann simply refers to a "security dilemma." 
Additionally, it can be observed that the definitions of Kaufmann's variables are 
somewhat vague; precise measurement is lacking in the original articles, and 
therefore here we will attempt to approximate historical observation to the above 
variables. As the reader will see, even at a more abstract level, many potential 
issues with the variables become clear.47 
To examine the Cyprus problem and the events of 1974 in the context of 
Chaim Kaufmann's theories on ethnic conflict and partition, one must first 
establish that the abstract independent variable in Kaufmann's theories 
corresponds to the Cyprus situation sufficiently to make the comparison between 
abstract theory and reality. To do this, the abstract independent variable will be 
broken down into three separate components based on Kaufmann's criteria. 
These components are akin to "preexisting conditions," characteristics allowing a 
46
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security dilemma to develop in a domestic situation. Each of these components 
will be evaluated in the context of the situation on Cyprus in 1974 by asking the 
following questions. The questions are: 1) Is the population composed of ethnic 
groups with distinct ethnic identities? 2) Are these identities "hardened", as 
determined by the degree of polarization between the groups? 3) Is there 
mobilization of these groups? Once these questions are answered, one must 
then consider whether an intrastate security dilemma existed. 
For the testing portion of this paper, a crucial case study of the situation in 
Cyprus in the summer of 1974 is utilized to see if the hypothesized theory, based 
on the theories of Chaim Kaufmann concerning the security dilemma and 
partition, is sufficient, or if the hypothesized independent variable cannot be 
linked sufficiently to the given dependent variable. As described above, the 
situation in Cyprus occurred as the result of many factors; it is the suggestion of 
the security dilemma and related primary influences as the root cause of the 
partition that this case study endeavors to explore. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CASE OF CYPRUS 
Historical Background 
Before entering into a discussion regarding the nature and measurement 
of the dependent variable in the case, a brief overview of the situation on Cyprus 
leading up to the 1974 partition is useful and instructive. Cyprus has a long 
history, and there have been a multitude of influences on the population which 
became known as the Cypriots. These influences have more recently been 
consolidated into two primary "Cypriot" identities - the following touches just 
lightly the historical ramifications of this. 
While there is strong evidence of numerous Neolithic settlements having 
existed on the island, Cyprus has since ancient times been inhabited by a 
population that culturally and religiously self-identified as Greek. This 
identification survived despite the fact that the early Cypriots were repeatedly 
conquered by competing civilizations from the Classical through the medieval 
periods. In the 16th century it was occupied by the Ottoman Empire, the original 
source of much of the ancestry of Turkish Cypriot population. As in many other 
places, the Ottomans ruled the island using the millet system, allowing self-rule 
within the Greek Orthodox community, so long as taxes were promptly paid.1 
The relationship between the Ottomans and the Greek population of Cyprus has 
1
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been variously described as good to exploitative on the part of the Ottomans; 
aside from a series of public executions on the island at the time of the Greek 
War of Independence, there is little evidence of violence between the 
communities during the occupation, especially since the Greek Cypriot 
community was considerably larger than the Ottoman one, which "drifted to the 
island"2 during this period. 
The Ottomans retained control of the island until the United Kingdom 
leased the island in the 19th century in return for providing assistance with 
Turkish struggles with the Russian Empire. The British later declared it a crown 
colony following the Ottoman alliance with Germany during World War I and its 
subsequent downfall. British control came at a time when there was increasing 
Greek nationalism among the Greek Cypriots. While the Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots had lived relatively harmoniously alongside each other as 
previously mentioned (especially in contrast with other areas of the world in 
which culturally Greek and culturally Turkish peoples coexisted), the growth of 
Greek nationalism led to intercommunal suspicions, the teaching of Greek and 
Turkish nationalist perspectives of historical tensions between the communities, 
and increasing political distrust. Ultimately, nationalism led to the development of 
the "enosis" movement on the island - an active push for unification with 
Greece.3 This movement intensified in the years following the Second World 
War, during which many Greek Cypriots volunteered for the Allies, and 
2
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subsequently developed an expectation of some degree of independence in 
return.4 
The enosis movement among the Greek Cypriots existed in a relatively 
civil manner until the 1950's. Archbishop Makarios III, head of the autocephalous 
Cypriot Orthodox Church, had attempted to use his influence on the Greek 
Cypriot population to pressure the British government for independence; in 1950 
he held a plebiscite in which 96% of Greek Cypriots supposedly demanded 
enosis.5 Subsequent efforts to involve Greece and the United Nations in creating 
a path towards unification with Greece failed (largely due to Britain insistence on 
its maintenance of sovereignty over the island). Makarios and the retired 
Cypriot-born Greek Colonel (later General) George Grivas then began to use the 
church and a violent rebellion (in coordination with each other) to pressure the 
United Kingdom into turning the island over to the Greeks,6 and to gain the 
attention of the United Nations and the world community at the same time. The 
minority-Turkish Cypriots, however, were unnerved by the prospect of enosis and 
rallied the Turkish government to their own cause, which was embodied by a 
desire for either the status quo, or a cantonal partition.7 When the issue was 
finally brought up in the United Nations and in subsequent multilateral 
negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the UK, it was ultimately decided by 
the "guarantor powers" that neither enosis, nor a return to Turkish rule, was 
4
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acceptable. Turkey refused to allow Greek control of the island; their refusal is 
often attributed to the security threat that a potentially large Greek bastion off 
their southern coast would pose, as well as their concern for their brethren on the 
island. 
The United Kingdom granted the island independence instead, which was 
grudgingly accepted by many Cypriots in both communities.8 However, in the 
course of the campaign for freedom from the United Kingdom, both the Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had become highly wary of each other due to 
occasional "collateral" violence in the course of the Greek Cypriot campaign 
against the British, and the British habit of preferring to employ Turkish Cypriots 
over the Greek Cypriots in civil servant positions (which included the police 
force). 
After the establishment of independence from the United Kingdom in 
1960, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots struggled to coexist. The 
independence itself was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, 
with assurances that one or more of them would interfere in the island's politics if 
it became clear that the situation there had become unacceptably hostile to either 
community, or if either community attempted unification with their "motherland"9; 
this created looming pressure on the government from the beginning. In 
protection of this guarantee, a few hundred Turkish and Greek troops were 
mandated to be stationed on the island, and those numbers ballooned 
8
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unsurprisingly beyond the set levels at a rapid pace.10 The Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots attempted to make a unitary government function; the constitution was 
instituted with the cooperation of the three guarantor powers and its creators 
were cognizant of the fact that tensions were high between the two communities 
on the island, as radical Greek Cypriot elements continued to demand enosis, 
and small, militant Turkish Cypriot groups prepared for conflict. The constitution 
provided for shared government, with generous proportions of government 
positions granted to the Turkish Cypriots given their numbers (in an effort to 
prevent the Turkish Cypriots from being steamrolled in administrative decisions 
by the majority - roughly 80% of the population was Greek Cypriot at the time), 
and shared veto power over the approval of legislation.11 
However, the majority Greek Cypriots took full control of the government 
of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, when the minority Turkish Cypriots pulled out 
of the government and retreated into enclave communities scattered around the 
island following a protracted series of intercommunal attacks and counterattacks 
that year. The fighting was seemingly prompted by the Archbishop's (now the 
first Cypriot president) attempts to reorganize the constitution and the political 
discord that the attempts created. Due to the quotas on employees from each 
community, many positions dedicated to Turkish Cypriots were going unfilled and 
government functions had come to a standstill. Turkey, in its role as a guarantor 
Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus. Kent: Quartet Books Limited, 1984: 65 
11
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power, rejected the reorganization attempts even before the Cypriot Vice 
President (by law a Turkish Cypriot) Fazil Kuchuk had a chance to veto them.12 
Stronger and more violent underlying differences were ever-present. 
Sporadic intercommunal violence persisted for a time even after UN 
peacekeepers were installed on the island in 1964; the UN as an organization 
was attempting to bring the two communities together under some form of 
cooperative government, yet often were only able to keep opposing groups of 
Cypriots apart and in separate neighborhoods in the cities using peacekeeping 
troops; even this proved a challenge, however13 The Turkish government even 
launched a series of aerial bombings when peacekeepers could not prevent an 
attack on a particular Turkish Cypriot enclave; they were then told in stark terms 
by the American President Lyndon Johnson not to do more to inflame the 
situation.14 In late-1967, following the formation of a military government in 
mainland Greece, the (mainland) Greek-supported, trained and staffed Cypriot 
National Guard launched a series of raids on Turkish Cypriot neighborhoods and 
enclaves, apparently without the will of the core leadership of the Greek Cypriot 
government. The negative reaction among both the Greek Cypriot leadership 
and the world community lead to the expulsion of the Greek contingent of troops 
(as well as a near invasion by Turkey).15 By 1967, this contingent had reached at 
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least 10,000; many were to covertly return. Obviously, this did nothing to 
increase the confidence of the Turkish Cypriots. 
The period following the 1967 crisis was one of relative calm, and of talks 
which "focused on a search for a system of local government which would give 
Turkish-Cypriots a degree of autonomy without endangering the unity of the 
state."16 While the violence began to subside following the expulsion of Greek 
troops and the initiation of the bi-communal talks in 1968, those talks had yet to 
achieve a resolution when the partition was enacted six years later. As the talks 
were ongoing, there was quiet surge in operational strength among the Greek 
Cypriot extremists under the name EOKA-B, who, organized by General Grivas 
(who had become disenchanted with Makarios after believing that enosis was no 
longer the goal in the mind of the president) and supported by the mainland 
government of Greece, turned their attention to the Greek Cypriot government of 
President Makarios. There were numerous assassination attempts on the 
president during this time (all of which the president "miraculously" escaped from 
- even a helicopter crash - thereby cementing his nearly cult of personality 
status among many Greek Cypriots).17 
However, by 1974 high-ranking members of the Greek junta (including 
Colonel loannidis, the purported day-to-day leader) began to plan for an outright 
coup. According to Laurence Stern, significant sums of money had been coming 
from Athens to support EOKA-B's plans - which were dedicated primarily to the 
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toppling of President Makarios (in the name of enosis).18 While General Grivas 
died shortly before the plan was executed, the Greek junta was able to keep his 
extremist group together and put a man named Nikos Sampson, notorious for his 
open hatred (and past murders) of the Turkish Cypriots, in place as its nominal 
leader.19 On July 15th, 1974, a small number of tanks and armored vehicles 
rolled from National Guard barracks to the Presidential Palace in the capital of 
Nicosia, as well as to the town halls of the other major cities in Cyprus. In 
Nicosia, martial law was declared, as was the death of Makarios (in fact, 
Makarios walked out the back door of the Presidential Palace, across a street, 
and into a taxi, which eventually brought him to the British bases for safe escort 
off of the island). Sampson was then put in place as the new President of 
Cyprus. He would remain in this position for a total of eight days; the coup and 
his installation as president precipitated the crisis just prior to the partition of the 
island. 
Examining the Dependent Variable 
Kaufmann's definition of partition, as previously stated, is: a "(separation) 
jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two 
sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or 
imposed on both sides by a stronger third party."20 In this case, it was the latter 
which occurred. In order for Cyprus to constitute a partition by Kaufmann's 
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definition, one must consider Turkey to be a separate entity from the Turkish 
Cypriot community on Cyprus, given that it was Turkey which acted to separate 
the two communities on the island (keeping in mind that the "why" is still the 
outstanding question). Even given the sensitivity of applying labels to the 
communities on the island and their respective cultural homelands, it is generally 
held in the literature that this was the case prior to 1974, despite outstanding 
arguments concerning the ethnicity of the Turkish Cypriot community. These 
arguments are considered in greater detail in coming chapters. 
Based on Kaufmann's definition and the history of Cyprus, the dependent 
variable in this particular case, "partition of Cyprus", is a fairly straightforward 
historical event in itself (indeed, it is the reasons for its occurrence that are being 
framed by the security dilemma argument). On July 20th, 1974, five days after 
the coup against the Makarios government, the Turkish military launched an 
invasion by air and sea from the southern coast of Turkey to the northern coast 
of Cyprus and established positions on the northern coast. Initially linking two 
major Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the military paused when the junta-supported 
regime fell (along with the junta itself, which faced major domestic and 
international backlash following the removal of Makarios). Fiona Adamson 
describes how Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit "appeared to believe that 
(the resulting change in government in Athens following the unsuccessful coup) 
would lead to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict,"21 and the leader of the Cypriot 
House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, became interim President and 
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began negotiations with the Turkish government to reach an acceptable 
conclusion. The negotiations reached an impasse over the creation of separate 
zones for the communities, however, and the Turkish military proceeded to take 
over the northern 37% of the island by the end of the following month. Nearly all 
of the Greek Cypriots north of the line set up by UN troops after the end of the 
Turkish advance were expelled to the south during this time. Turkish Cypriots 
both fled, and were pressured by the Turkish military to flee, north, to the point 
where very few of one community were left in the areas controlled by the 
opposite community. This resulted in the complete, de facto division of the 
territory in which the two communities once coexisted politically (at peace and in 
struggle). The division of the island has not been recognized in international law 
or by any individual nation except for Turkey and, for a time, Pakistan. This 
division was imposed on both communities by a stronger third-party, and 
therefore, for the purposes of this paper, this fulfills the requirement of linking the 
dependent variable of Kaufmann to the case of Cyprus. There have been 
various proposed explanations for why the partition occurred: there are 
numerous authors which have proposed theories that suggest there was an 
international imperative to solve the situation as it threatened to involve two 
NATO allies in a direct conflict.22 Others have pointed to the domestic policy of 
See, for example: Parker T. Hart, Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1990 
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Turkey regarding the post-coup situation. Kaufmann's theory focuses our study 
on the domestic situation within Cyprus itself. 
See, for example: Fiona B. Adamson, "Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," Political Science Quarterly 116:2 (Summer 2001) 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN CYPRUS 
The relevant aspects of Kaufmann's theory must be identified in the case 
of Cyprus by examining the three components described in Chapter 1.1 
Kaufmann's characteristics which allow for the presentation of the security 
dilemma logic in a domestic setting are each evaluated independently, and then 
a consideration of the three together is given, followed by an analysis of any 
apparent security dilemma. 
Ethnic Identities 
With regard to the first component, as to whether there were distinct ethnic 
identities in the two communities in question, the answer is mostly 
straightforward. While the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had co-
existed on the island for centuries, they continued to retain their ethnic identities, 
and these existed in 1974. The Greek Cypriots spoke Greek, were Greek 
Orthodox Christians, and had developed strong Hellenistic feelings and 
traditions. The Turkish Cypriots spoke Turkish, were Sunni Muslims, and looked 
to Turkey as their cultural homeland. 
Historically the Greek Cypriots were allowed to retain independent 
religious leadership while under Ottoman and British rule; this leadership was "a 
1
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44 
source of continuity and security during occupation"2 and allowed the Cypriots to 
keep their Greek identity. The Turkish Cypriots lived by the Ottoman set of rules, 
the Greek Cypriots by their own. However the Ottomans also used "confiscatory" 
colonial tactics to take advantage of the Greek Cypriots, contributing to later 
Greek nationalism,3 and placing the Greek Cypriots in a iower "class" than the 
Turkish Cypriots. According to Joseph, as quoted in Lindley, although there 
were, "four centuries of coexistence and considerable physical intermingling, the 
two communities remained separate and distinct ethnic groups."4 During the 
British period, the Greek Cypriots began rallying for enosis, resulting in the 
Turkish Cypriot response of taksim, or the partition of the island into two 
territories, to be absorbed by their respective "motherlands". At this point, 
according to Wolfe, "the conflict had begun,"5 and very little (though with some 
significant exceptions) cultural convergence of the two communities occurred 
leading up to the events of 1974. 
One potential flaw in this component being applied to the Cyprus problem 
is the argument that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots might not have held on to 
the "Cypriot" party of their identity at all, but rather considered themselves Greek 
and Turkish nationals, and oriented themselves in this way. There is some 
supporting evidence to this assertion, especially given the segregation between 
2
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the two communities in the 1960's. Even after the establishment of an 
independent Cyprus, each community had been "encouraged to establish and 
maintain separate 'special relationships' with their motherlands," especially with 
regards to "educational, cultural, religious, sporting and ethnic related matters."6 
Schools received Greek or Turkish textbooks, and the longstanding historical 
conflict between the two civilizations was routinely emphasized. 
It is clear that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot government did not act in a 
way that promoted a Greek national identity, however. While President Makarios 
had at times referred to the notion that all Cypriots were Greek, he convincingly 
shifted his priorities over the 1960s by moving away from enosis and instead 
towards establishing a strong Cypriot government. As Schaeffer argues, 
Makarios "did not want to subordinate his movement to Greek authority or 
antagonize Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority."7 This was especially true 
following the takeover of the Greek government by a (by most accounts) fanatical 
junta in 1967. There is evidence that most Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, had 
begun to value their independence along the same lines as Makarios, at least 
more so than with the radical elements of Cypriot society.8 Continued reverence 
for the pro-enosis zealots on the part of a small minority existed as an influence 
on the island is a consideration that should not be taken lightly, however. 
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The general argument concerning a lack of the "Cypriot" part of identity 
altogether deserves greater exploration than this current study can provide for, 
as information concerning that identity has been, in the opinion of the author, 
often very partial and generally unreliable. It is generally held in the literature, 
however, that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were independent 
communities, and while culturally linked to their respective mainlands, they were 
for the time being independent political communities as well. For the purposes of 
this study it is suggested that the Cyprus situation satisfies the first Component, 
as it is clear that there were distinctions between Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot identity. 
Hardened Identities 
With regard to the second component, there are a variety of ways in which 
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities had hardened by the summer of 
the partition, and the most clearly observable are the instances of ethnically-
based violence that had occurred leading up to the point at which the island was 
partitioned, and the effect on each community in the aftermath of those 
instances. There was sporadic intercommunal fighting in the British period, 
followed by widespread fighting at the collapse of the constitution in 1963, and 
reckless (Greek-supported and controlled) Cypriot National Guard action in 1967-
68 that sparked another round of fighting. Following the conflict in 1963, a United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Force (UNFICYP) was sent to enforce a separation of 
two neighborhoods in the capital and to prevent the outbreak of fighting between 
the two communities around the island; additionally, the Turkish military 
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threatened to invade in 1967 on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots; both instances 
contributed to a hardening of identity because of partial physical and total 
psychological separation based on ethnicity and a threat to one ethnicity by a 
force related to the other.9 
Chaim Kaufmann, in his own evaluation of the partition of Cyprus, 
observes modes occurring over the few decades preceding the partition by which 
the two communities had hardened their identities. These well-documented 
examples include: a) the previously mentioned separate educational systems 
from the times of British rule through the time of independence, where each 
"represented its own people as consistently heroic and the other as consistently 
barbaric;"10 and b) the persistent existence of a pro-enosis Greek Cypriot militia 
after the independence of the country in 1960, which the Greek Cypriot 
government itself was having trouble controlling. Known as EOKA-B (the second 
version of EOKA, the Greek Cypriot rebel group during the 1950's), it would be 
partially responsible for the coup that took place just before partition.11 
In addition to Kaufmann's observations, there are numerous other 
characteristic examples that can be pointed to. Souter cites the constitution of 
the independent Cyprus, which, in granting "exceptional minority rights" to the 
Turkish Cypriots, had "frustrated" the Greek Cypriots still pining for enosis, and 
9
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precipitated some of the violence that has been described already.12 Laurence 
Stern begins his piece on Cyprus with a detailed description of the funeral of 
General George Grivas, the leader of EOKA and EOKA-B, and describes how 
"some 100,000 Greek Cypriots in all" came in person to honor a man known for 
his "fanatical...pursuit of the age-old Hellenic dream of enosis" and harsh attitude 
towards the Turkish Cypriots - and this just months before the partition.13 All of 
these points taken together suggest that there was considerable polarization 
between the two communities at various times during the period being 
considered. 
Mobilization 
With regard to the third component, or the mobilization of each side, the 
answer is not as immediately clear that the situation on Cyprus meets the 
abstract definition, and for a number of good reasons. For the sake of argument 
and in the interest of testing the basic, underlying hypothesis, this author will 
suggest that this component is fulfilled as well; however, serious reservations 
exist and will be expressed here. The main question lies in the following: who 
was mobilized, and more importantly, what were they mobilized for? Mobilization 
in this case is strictly related to traditional military/strategic capability; Kaufmann 
does not treat mobilization as being consistent of anything other than the 
traditional notion of an ability and willingness to fight, unlike some authors that 
suggest mobilization can take the form of actively appealing to and strengthening 
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identity. For Kaufmann the significance of identity, while clearly present based 
on the previous two components, is distinct from traditional mobilization. 
Based on earlier fighting, which was often fierce, there is a general 
assumption that there was a willingness on both sides to fight if necessary. 
Additionally, by the mid-1970's the Turkish Cypriots stiii mostly confined 
themselves to defensible enclaves or exclusive neighborhoods for the perceived 
need for protection and self-governance, which presented what was arguably 
strategic threats to the Greek Cypriots; the interspersed nature of the Turkish 
Cypriot communities within the overwhelming majority of the land inhabited by 
the Greek Cypriots recalls Posen's arguments about interspersed populations 
and violence. Additionally according to Kaufmann, while "in theory the enclaves 
were under tight blockade... in practice weapons and... fighters were smuggled 
into many of them."14 The Greek Cypriots, in control of the internationally 
recognized government, with the ability to buy weapons from foreign 
governments for its Cypriot National Guard (composed of as many Greek 
national officers as it was of Cypriot officers) had an established force to use 
against the Turkish Cypriots. The presence of a Greek-supported, pro-enosis 
extremist force on the island also constitutes the mobilization of some of the 
Greek Cypriots. 
However, even at first glance the assumption of mobilized Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot forces with the specific (immediate) intent to harm each other 
after 1968 is suspect. Between 1968 and 1974, there was a period of "relative 
14
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calm"15 in which the two sides "conducted direct negotiations,"16 which were, 
according to Souter, "frequently constructive."17 During this time there were very 
few deaths, "perhaps several tens"18 at the most, according to Kaufmann (it 
should be noted that this estimate is the highest found by this author), related to 
the intercommunal conflict directly. Glafkos Clerides, the chief Greek Cypriot 
negotiator, and future Greek Cypriot president during the post-coup period of 
stabilization, reportedly believed that "the talks might have been proven 
productive if external powers had not intervened."19 This may seem to suggest 
that mobilization, clearly evident in late-1967 at which time there had been 
skirmishes silenced only by firm Turkish threats of invasion, had decreased. 
Additionally, what might further dampen the analysis that the Greek 
Cypriots were mobilized to the point of a willingness to act was Greek Cypriot 
strategic concern that exceeded the bounds of the domestic situation. Even 
Grivas, as fanatical as he is said to have been, knew that if the Greek Cypriots 
(or Greeks in general) were to push too far, the Turkish Cypriots might be aided 
by the Turkish government. Whether this was because of Turkish concern for 
the Turkish Cypriots, or simply Turkey's desire for Cyprus not to become a 
strategic threat is beside the point. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led by the 
15
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hundreds of Greek officers and thousands of Greek troops that had been 
smuggled to the island after 1963, had learned this the hard way in 1967 after 
attacking the town of Kophinou, which led to a near-Turkish invasion, Turkish 
airstrikes and the expulsion of Grivas and most of the mainland Greek troops 
from the island."" 
This is in no way to suggest that intercommunal animosity had simply 
disappeared once the Greek and Greek Cypriot extremists lost their foothold in 
1967-68. There were clearly elements of Greek Cypriot society which continued 
to despise the presence of the Turkish Cypriots and would have attempted to 
reduce that presence if at all possible. However, a combination of a shift in 
strategic focus and the linking of mainland Turkish interests with the situation on 
the island made the realization of the more genocidal intentions of extremist 
Greek Cypriots impossible. The Greek Cypriot irregulars' consideration of ends 
(making Cyprus a "Greek" island) versus means (their military might) is a 
domestic determination of relative strength, yet directed not towards the primary 
domestic opponent, but an external element. 
Despite its close ethnic and cultural ties to the Turkish Cypriot community, 
the Turkish government until 1974 was distinct from any government on Cyprus. 
As suggested by Borowiec and others, Turkey has been since the 1950's more 
concerned with preventing Greece from obtaining Cyprus as a potential forward 
base a mere 40-odd miles off its southern coast; the fact that protecting the 
Turkish Cypriots was popular in Turkey made their interest in the island more 
David Souter, 663 
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resolute. It remains unclear what their role in the island's governance has been 
since then, but this is also beside the point. 
The Greek Cypriot irregulars by the late-1960's were certainly armed and 
dangerous, but following 1967-68, primarily used their resources and influence 
against the interests of President Makarios, who by this time was seen by the 
rightist groups as the primary impediment to their ultimate goal, enosis.22 This 
perspective and the rightists' continued motivation following what can only be 
described as a major defeat at Kophinou, also was likely a product of another 
external element. The Greek government fell to its military leaders in 1967, and 
the junta established in its place was stridently anti-communist, anti-Turk, and 
anti-Makarios. According to Loizos, "the Greek dictators had no love for 
President Makarios since he was democratically elected and popular, and 
seemed tolerant towards communists."23 
The 1960 agreement that had allowed the Cypriots their independence 
from Great Britain had also established a small presence of troops from Greece 
and Turkey; the officers from Greece were primarily responsible for training the 
Cypriot National Guard. Loizos describes how "these officers did their best to 
indoctrinate the young Cypriots with the junta's ideas, and kept a list of any 
conservatives who were particularly hostile to the Makarios government."24 By 
the early 1970's, these officers had "started clandestinely to distribute weapons, 
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uniforms, and remuneration to those they enrolled in a new underground 
movement formed in 1972, which became known as EOKA B."25 The purpose of 
this organization and its activities was to undermine Makarios, weed out the 
'false' Greeks26, and enact the union of Cyprus with Greece as soon as possible. 
The presence of the Greek irregulars and their influence after 1968 must 
be put into some context. First, in the 1968 Cypriot presidential election, the 
opposition leader Takis Evdokas, someone who openly advocated for enosis, 
received 2% of the vote; Makarios won the other 98%.27 Makarios was 
supported by both leftist parties on Cyprus, including the Communist party AKEL; 
moderates also supported him precisely because of his opponent's continued 
active support for enosis. Second, following the failure of EOKA B to secure its 
goals in 1974, numerous Cypriot individuals were accused and/or convicted of 
subversion by the Cypriot government, due to their participation in EOKA B. The 
total number of both accused and convicted members was 827.28 By 
comparison, mainland Greek troops on the island, when at their legal (and 
lowest) levels, numbered 950.29 These figures are intended to provide some 
idea of the relative influence that enosis-driven Cypriot forces on the island had 
in relation to their numbers (Tishkov's lessons about numbers in conflict aside). 
25
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How many members of a given ethnicity does it take for action to constitute an 
entire ethnic group's intent in an ethnic conflict? Especially when those taking 
the action were "in power" for less than a week? These are questions for a 
broader study of the subject. 
Markides summarizes the development of EOKA B and its activities in the 
context of the ethnic struggle by saying that, during the period between 1967 and 
the partition, the "Turkish Cypriots remained spectators to the intra-Greek Cypriot 
rivalry."30 This is significant when considering this component as necessary for 
testing the variables in this case overall. He goes on to list several occasions on 
which there was actually Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cooperation, 
including a celebration of football (one of the most treasured past times on the 
island), Archbishop Makarios tour of and promise of aid to a tornado-devastated 
Turkish Cypriot enclave, a polite meeting between Makarios and the former 
Cypriot Vice President Fazil Kucuk, and even the willingness of Turkish Cypriot 
hardliner Rauf Denktash to attend a meeting of the Greek Cypriot-dominated 
Cyprus Sociological Association without bodyguards.31 These might appear to 
some to be small gestures, yet the reader should recall that Cyprus is a small 
place; leadership is often embodied by just a few individuals. 
Even still, in the context of EOKA B's insurgency, intercommunal relations 
were unlikely to have significantly improved following the generally poor 
conditions of relations post-1968. Poor relations and actively hostile ones are 
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two separate things, however. Some authors, including Necatigil, make 
arguments claiming there was a sufficient level of mobilization among the Greek 
Cypriots in the month-long period between the initial Turkish invasion of the 
island and the actual partition which would have been sufficient cause for the 
partition; these arguments say, in effect, that the Greek Cypriots became 
mobilized to the point of carrying out murders in Turkish Cypriot communities 
during the chaotic period following both invasions, in reaction to the loss of any 
central leadership.32 While Necatigil points to a handful of newspaper articles, 
most of the support for his argument comes from a pair of Turkish sources, one 
written by the Turkish Cypriot hardline leader Rauf Denktash. Paul Sant Cassia, 
who researched Cypriot deaths on the island during this period reports that "with 
a few notorious exceptions that affected the Turkish Cypriots, most losses and 
disappearances were Greek Cypriots."33 He also blames most of the deaths on 
the extremist, Greek-supported Greek Cypriots and the remainder on the 
invading Turkish army, and not the Turkish Cypriots. This is all besides the point 
when looking at the argument that an intrastate security dilemma caused the 
partition as well; once the Turkish invasion occurred, the dynamic clearly 
changed. 
All of this taken together undermines to some degree the notion, often 
casually expressed in literature in which Cyprus is referred to, that Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were at each others' throats leading up to the 
32 
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Turkish invasion. The period between invasion and partition shows more of a 
potential for having clear mobilization of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish 
Cypriots, but it is not clear that the Turkish Cypriots were at all mobilized relative 
to other forces on the island; the evidence for widespread popular mobilization of 
Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots, beyond the rhetoric, is fairly thin prior to 
the Turkish invasion. Finally, there is the notion that the initial Turkish invasion 
changed the dynamic of the security dilemma to the point where an intrastate 
security dilemma could not account for the losses on both sides, because it no 
longer existed. Therefore, this could lead one to wonder if the situation on Cyprus 
matches the criteria for Kaufmann's independent variable. 
Presence of a Security Dilemma 
In terms of a security dilemma, there is no clear demonstration of the 
traditional notion of increases in security on both sides that is directly related to 
the domestic increase in security on the other side, at least not purely so. This is 
because the Greek Cypriot increases in security, while conceivably resulting in 
Turkish Cypriot increases, were the result of Greek-on-Greek conflict or concerns 
over a possible Turkish invasion. Remember, Kaufmann treats the identity 
components and the mobilization components separately. While there is clear 
evidence that identities were hardened and the opportunities to bolster those 
identities were taken at every turn, it has not been demonstrated that identity-
based mobilization was relevant with regards to Kaufmann's notions of 
mobilization generally. 
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We could stop here and say that the Cyprus case does not fully embody 
the intrastate security dilemma as described by Kaufmann; however, Kaufmann 
believes that Cyprus is indeed a qualifying case, and because the third 
component can be argued in either direction, we proceed to evaluate the overall 
argument on the assumption that there is a sufficient ievel of similarity between 
the independent variable generally and the Cyprus case. We remain cognizant, 
however, of the potential logical weaknesses in comparing the two, and will 
return to this argument in the conclusion of this paper. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING THE CASE OF CYPRUS 
To evaluate the argument, we need to ask whether Kaufmann's 
independent variable leads to the dependent variable in this case. In other 
words, did the presence of an intrastate security dilemma characterized by 
hardened ethnic identities and mobilization on Cyprus lead to, or cause, the 
partition of the country. To begin, we look at the ways in which the independent 
variable might have caused the dependent variable, given what we know about 
both variables. Then this is weighed against the totality of information about the 
event itself, to determine if the independent variable is indeed necessary and 
sufficient to explain the dependent variable, only necessary, or neither. 
The ways in which the security dilemma of Cyprus might have caused the 
partition of the country have, of course, been partially discussed above. The 
ingrained nature of ethnic identities based on nationalist education, a history of 
violence and distrust, the constant presence of (albeit small) ethnic militias, and 
the partial physical separation of the two communities after the 1963 withdrawal 
of the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves, contribute to the notion that the 
communities were "ready" for partition by Kaufmann's; as Kaufmann describes in 
his theories concerning ethnic separation, once these ethnic identities have 
formed and there is a willingness to fight on the part of those in each community, 
then the only possible outcome is the complete physical separation of both 
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groups in partition, or the complete annihilation of one group by the other. In 
Cyprus, the former occurred before the latter could, or so the theory goes. 
Yet, in addition to the previously mentioned concern about the situation in 
Cyprus constituting a security dilemma, a number of questions must immediately 
be raised about the theory's application to the Cyprus case. The first asks why 
the Cyprus conflict did not result in the complete destruction of one side or the 
other (as opposed to partition) if there are two possible outcomes of the type of 
ethnic division and mobilization described by Kaufmann in his theory. According 
to Kaufmann, "Cyprus may have been lucky not to have experienced more 
rounds of war than it did,"1 and many of the reasons why genocide did not occur 
lay in the determination by each side that the other could threaten their own 
existence if they provoked a conflict. For the Greek Cypriots, however, the 
determination was based on fear not of the Turkish Cypriots, but of Turkey itself. 
Turkey was a mere 40 miles from the northern shore of Cyprus; the Turkish 
Cypriot enclaves were, according to Kaufmann, "militarily strong enough to be 
useful to invading Turkish forces,"2 yet too weak to present any true threat to 
Greek Cypriot offensive capability on their own. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led 
by General Grivas, had made the mistake of attacking an enclave in force in late-
1967, as previously mentioned; Turkey was barely restrained from launching an 
all-out invasion at that point. 
While Turkey's involvement technically lies outside of the realm of 
"domestic determinants", the strategic logic of the Greek Cypriots (irregulars or 
1
 Chaim D. Kaufmann, "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus," 213 
2
 Ibid., 214 
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otherwise) to not risk a full scale attack on the Turkish Cypriots was determined 
in the context of the domestic problem. If neither side was to destroy the other, 
then this brings us back to partition and our second question. Why, or perhaps 
more appropriately, how did partition occur as a result of the security dilemma 
given the logic concerning the relative strength of both sides? If there existed 
ethnic polarization, hardened ethnic identities, the potential willingness and 
capability to use force against the other community, yet the knowledge that the 
same existed on the other side, then why does partition occur as opposed to a 
stasis of the situation? A catalyst of some sort which prompted a change in the 
domestic situation must have conceivably been present; yet the clear catalyst of 
a Greek-sponsored coup in the July preceding the partition falls outside of the 
logic of the security dilemma and the realm of domestic determinants. It 
becomes clear that the theory, based as it is on domestic determinants and the 
dynamics of ethnic politics, is not sufficient to explain the dependent variable in 
this case, though it is also clear that it remains a potential component of the 
reason why partition occurred. 
At the domestic determinants level, a significant preexisting condition to 
the partition was the degree to which EOKA B and its Greek co-conspirators had 
fragmented the authority of the Greek Cypriot government on Cyprus. There is a 
much more clearly identifiable, active security situation (if not a true security 
dilemma) between Greek Cypriot government forces and EOKA B forces than 
there was an ever-escalating, identity-based security dilemma between the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots during this time period. Even with this 
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security situation, much of its outcome was determined by the actions of a 
foreign power, Greece. This fight in Cyprus was, after all, a fight between those 
wishing to unite the island with Greece, and those who had come to see the 
immediate perils of doing so. The strategic dilemma a purely Greek takeover of 
Cyprus might present to Turkey is easy to imagine, then and now. The reievance 
of this to Kaufmann's theory, however, is slight, as his security dilemma attempts 
to explain outcomes like partition during ethnic conflict. There is no way to 
construe the dispute between different factions of the Greek Cypriots in the 
1970's as a security dilemma along the lines of the identity-based dilemma that 
Kaufmann describes, of course. 
Again, none of this is to negate the intercommunal problems; they were 
real and continue to exist today. It would be unwise to question the major role 
that the intercommunal conflict had in the eventual partition of the island; the 
conflict certainly invited the international attention that the island would receive, 
for better or worse. The question is whether the security dilemma Kaufmann and 
others sees existed on the island in a way which led to the partition, and given 
what has been described, it seems unlikely that the security dilemma was either 
the primary factor or a sufficient condition. Therefore, while the intercommunal 
conflict might have "set the stage" for the partition, it was not sufficient to make 
the show go on. At the time of the partition, there were more palpable issues 
which may have led to the partition. 
Throughout the course of researching the case, it has become obvious 
that there existed considerable internal and external pressures on the situation in 
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Cyprus. Some were invited by the governments involved, some not, but the 
Cyprus problem was not limited to domestic, ethnic conflict alone. This does not 
mean, on the other hand, that international level forces that were clearly present 
on the island can be said to be both necessary and sufficient to have caused the 
partition of Cyprus either; based upon the iogic and case-specific details of 
testing Kaufmann, it appears as though the best explanation for the partition of 
Cyprus will likely take into account both domestic determinants and international 
level forces, and such a combination is not accounted for by intrastate security 
dilemma theory. 
Over the course of the years leading up to the partition of the island the 
heavy involvement by foreign powers in the affairs on the island often went 
beyond the control of those elected leaders on the island, whether in the 
Republic of Cyprus government (Greek Cypriots) or in the self-administered 
areas under Turkish-Cypriot control. This involvement blurred the lines between 
a domestic and international conflict and undermines the purity of domestic-level 
explanations that try to approach the ethnic conflict and its clear role in the 
eventual bisected condition of the island. However, there is abundant evidence 
that foreign powers had a direct hand in promoting, prompting and enacting the 
complete physical separation of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, 
contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of Cypriots. Indeed, while 
partition had been floated as an idea among the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
leadership since the time of the British ownership of the island, there is no 
evidence that this author has found that suggests that an arbitrary division of the 
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island into two, and the resulting massive population transfers, were preferred by 
either community. Foreign powers may have been allowed to have the influence 
that they did because of the domestic situation on Cyprus. However, the degree 
and nature of that influence throws into doubt the notion that an intrastate 
security dilemma or even any active security situation between rival factions 
(Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot conflict or Government/EOKA B conflict) can 
sufficiently account for the partition alone, or even to a sufficient degree. 
64 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT 
In reviewing everything that has been said thus far, it is clear that much of 
the ethnic dynamic described by Kaufmann's theories was real; what is less clear 
is that the specific domestic political situation he points to as the root cause of 
partition following ethnic conflict, the intrastate security dilemma, can be 
attributed to the partition that would occur in the case in Cyprus. Cyprus was 
torn in two by many different things. There was the intercommunal fighting that 
came with its historical experience and reinitiated largely by the particular 
character of its independence; there was also intense fighting between the 
various factions of Greek Cypriots, each having a different vision of the future for 
the island mapped out in their collective minds. When one ethnic group, the 
Turkish Cypriots, felt compelled to retreat into defensible enclaves in reaction to 
early troubles, and in anticipation of trouble to come, there existed a persistent 
source of tension between it and the other ethnic group which believed the entire 
island to be their home. The fact that both groups had long lived in intermixed 
areas and continued to be spread across the island reinforced the distrust; the 
fact that each community proceeded to try and isolate themselves from contact 
with the other only goes to demonstrate how that distrust was deepened over 
time. 
However, once the two communities had developed entrenched positions, 
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we see that even though there was a continued distrust of each other, there was 
a relative stasis for seven years in which extremist militias refocused their 
attentions on their own leaders, and intercommunal violence waned in the 
presence of a stable deterrent for both sides. This seven year period is crucial; 
while it cannot be said that the two communities functioned as a nation, the 
urgency of the intercommunal conflict had decreased to the point where there 
were signs of reconciliation - impossible according to Kaufmann. Additionally, 
the presence of militias targeting the leaders of their own community, while 
having a potentially negative effect on the security of the opposing identity, also 
undermined the identity of that community as well - this works against the logic 
of the security dilemma. 
It wasn't until a catalyzing event occurred that both communities were 
brought back into the fray, and by then the outcome was beyond the Cypriots' 
control. As we've seen, this wasn't a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot catalyst, 
but rather a primarily Greek catalyst, then swiftly overtaken by the inevitable 
Turkish response. The catalyst wasn't incidental, either. Since the birth of 
independent Cyprus, both Greece and Turkey had been charged with taking care 
of the island's sovereignty. Greece supplied large numbers of troops to the 
island to protect its interests, and the Turkish threatened to invade whenever the 
Greek Cypriots pushed too far. This all suggests that external forces had 
continued to affect Cypriot politics during its independence, that this would 
necessarily interrupt the logic of an intrastate security dilemma and its effect on 
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the island's status, and that the island's citizens were never truly left to their own 
devices. 
In light of the effect of these external forces on the logic of the security 
dilemma and the proposed link between the dilemma and partition, it is 
concluded here that the general theory concerning an intrastate security dilemma 
cannot sufficiently explain partition in the Cyprus case. The ideas that Kaufmann 
present are instructive in pulling out the nature of the domestic situation in 
Cyprus leading up to the partition, and it is argued that they also, in part, offer a 
necessary condition for the partitions occurrence. The partition is unlikely to 
have been effected as it was if both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots identified 
themselves as simply Cypriots, and aligned politically across communal lines. 
The experience of the United Kingdom in Cyprus in the 1950's demonstrates how 
even people from a dry little island in the Mediterranean can frustrate greater 
powers. Yet, based on the available theories and the reviewed evidence, it must 
be a combination of both the internal security situation and the external forces 
that are needed to properly explain why Cyprus was partitioned. 
The choice to test Chaim Kaufmann's theories on ethnic separation and 
partition at the domestic determinants level was made because these theories 
have been used in the past to justify future partition. A full understanding of past 
partitions, therefore, is important. The Cyprus case study was chosen in an 
attempt to demonstrate that past partitions, and even only those coming out of 
ethnic conflicts, do not necessarily all fit the same mold. While on the island of 
Cyprus there were continuously heightened suspicions, sporadic skirmishes and 
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occasional island-wide confrontations between two distinct ethnic groups, a 
variety of other influences on that situation led to the partition. The ethnic conflict 
may have contributed to that partition, but is not alone sufficient to explain it. 
Looking beyond the case of Cyprus and to the subjects of both partition 
and the security dilemma generally, there are a number of applicable lessons 
that this study can begin to contribute. What does this study mean practically for 
partition theory? It is simply a statement that suggests the notion that an 
intrastate security dilemma leads to partition in cases of ethnic conflict cannot be 
universally held to be true for past partitions that followed ethnic conflict. 
Because past cases of partition, including the case of Cyprus, are used to 
recommend the future use of partition, the study is also a tacit recommendation 
that perhaps greater, more accurate classification of past partitions would be 
appropriate. Kaufmann's definition of partition is loose enough to encompass 
many historical geopolitical divisions, the Cyprus case included. This study is not 
able to shed additional light on the definitional problems of partition because of 
the strict adherence to the definition offered by Kaufmann; however, a historical 
look at a specific instance of geopolitical division can hopefully contribute to the 
mass of knowledge that is used to resolve epistemological issues. Kaufmann's 
particular definition of partition described a historical situation like Cyprus 
accurately, yet his own explanation for that phenomenon could not account for a 
case which met his definition of partition. 
With regard to the intrastate security dilemma, this study raises questions 
concerning how to accommodate the "blurring of the lines" between domestic 
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and international influences on intrastate situations when there is discussion of 
the security dilemma using its original logic. The differences between the 
security dilemma logic in its traditional form and the security dilemma that is 
based on identity as a component of security could not be fully addressed in this 
study because of the way in which Kaufmann's argument was structured. While 
identity is, in theory, a significant component of the intrastate security dilemma, to 
what degree can it be accountable for geopolitical changes like partition in 
practice? This study could not reveal more insight into this issue, as the case of 
Cyprus, in this author's opinion, does not reveal identity, or a security dilemma 
based on "identity as security," to be a sufficient cause for the partition of Cyprus. 
Going forward, it may be useful to take a look at additional cases using the 
same framework and to see if the same issues appear. Was the same dynamic 
present in the case of the partition of India, for example, or in the breakup of 
Yugoslavia? The domestic use of the security dilemma was alluded to by 
Mearsheimer in the case of the latter at the time of its collapse, yet a structured 
look at the breakup of Yugoslavia from the perspective of Kaufmann's theory 
would present a useful counterpart to the analysis concerning Cyprus that was 
presented here. 
For the Cyprus case itself, this study is an attempt to clarify the often 
casually expressed relationship between the conflict among the Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots, and the partition of 1974. It is not a denial that such a 
conflict existed - and indeed was a fierce one that continues to this day. 
However, it is an affirmation that the ethnic conflict and the partition can be seen 
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as distinct components of the history of Cyprus, each characterized by different 
political dynamics which have yet to be fully understood. I conclude that a 
thorough review of the history of Cyprus cannot demonstrate the security 
dilemma to be the reason behind the partition. 
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APPENDIX 
SECURITY DILEMMA TABLES 
Table 1. Three Characteristic Components of the Security Dilemma 
(according to Kaufmann) 
Component 1 
Distinct Ethnic Identities 
Need for at least two 
groups in a given territory 
to claim cultural and 
religious identity distinct 
from one another 
Component 2 
Hardened Identities 
Of the two or more 
groups in a given territory 
with distinct identities, at 
least two must hold 
consistently to norms of 
culture and religion, and 
these must be seen in 
contrast to other 
identities by the group 
Component 3 
Mobilization 
At least two of the groups 
which hold on to 
identities which are 
hardened must be 
actively mobilized in the 
preparation for conflict 
between members of 
their group and another 
of a differing identity 
Table 2. Three Components of the Security Dilemma as Represented in Case of 
Cyprus 
Component 1 
Distinct Ethnic Identities 
Two distinct ethnic 
identities, one that 
considered itself 
culturally Greek and 
adhering to the Greek 
Orthodox religion, the 
other culturally Turkish 
and adhering to the 





Patterns of education and 
separation of the two 
communities during times 
of colonization lead to an 
understanding in each 
community of the other 






While there was militia 
activity in both 
communities, no 
evidence of widespread 
mobilization with the 
intent to destroy the other 
community leading up to 
the 1974 crisis. 
Component Fulfilled: 
UNCLEAR 
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